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There has been increasing interest in new economic models that aim to improve quality of life without
increasing consumption. This article provides the ﬁrst empirical analysis of how close modern-day
economies are to the concept of a “steady-state economy”, and explores whether there is any rela-
tionship between a country's proximity to such an economy and its social performance. The analysis is
carried out using the Degrowth Accounts, a set of 16 biophysical and social indicators that are derived
from Herman Daly's deﬁnition of a steady-state economy and the social goals of the degrowth move-
ment. These indicators are applied to ~180 countries over a 10-year period. The analysis reveals that the
majority of countries in the world are biophysical growth economies. There are only a small number of
countries where resource use is relatively constant from year to year (e.g. Denmark, France, Japan,
Poland, Romania, and the US), and only four countries experiencing biophysical degrowth (Germany,
Guyana, Moldova, and Zimbabwe). There are no countries that achieve a true steady-state economy,
deﬁned as an economy with a stable level of resource use maintained within ecological limits. However, a
few countries come relatively close, including Colombia, Cuba, Kyrgyzstan, Romania, and South Africa. In
general, countries with stable resource use perform better on many social indicators than countries with
either increasing or decreasing resource use. This ﬁnding runs contrary to conventional economic
thought. However, social performance is also higher in countries with greater per capita resource use.
Overall, these ﬁndings suggest that a steady-state economy can be socially sustainable, but countries
need to become much more efﬁcient at transforming natural resources into human well-being if all
seven billion people on Earth are to lead a good life within ecological limits.
© 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The scale of the human enterprise has increased at an unprec-
edented rate since the beginning of the industrial revolution. Over
the last century, the size of the global economy (as measured by
real GDP) increased by a factor of twenty-four (Maddison, 2010). At
the same time, global energy use increased by a factor of eleven and
material use increased by a factor of eight (Krausmann et al., 2009).
Environmentally-minded critics of growth argue that the
increasing scale of economic activity cannot continue indeﬁnitely
due to ﬁnite environmental limits (Rees, 2003), many of which are
already being surpassed (Hoekstra and Wiedmann, 2015; Steffenand Environment, University
ax: þ44 113 343 5259.et al., 2015). Socially-minded critics argue that even if economic
growth could continue, it is no longer a desirable goal for wealthy
nations to pursue because it is failing to improve people's lives:
although per capita GDP has more than tripled in nations like the
US and UK since 1950, measures of subjective well-being (e.g.
happiness) have ﬂat-lined (Layard, 2005; Easterlin et al., 2010).
Finally, practically-minded critics argue that high rates of growth
may simply not be possible in industrialised countries anymore due
to structural changes such as an ageing population and high levels
of debt (Gordon, 2012).
These criticisms have led a number of authors to call for a
different economic model whose aim is to improve quality of life
without relying on increasing consumption (Victor, 2008; Jackson,
2009; Chancel et al., 2013). Two ideas that are particularly impor-
tant in this discourse are “degrowth” (Latouche, 2009; D'Alisa et al.,
2014) and a “steady-state economy” (Daly, 2008; Czech, 2013; Dietz
and O'Neill, 2013). The concept of a steady-state economy was
Fig. 1. The indicators in the Degrowth Accounts. The indicators are divided into two
separate accounts (biophysical and social) and are organised along a spectrum from
means to ends.
1 Given this fact, they might also be referred to as the Steady-State Economy
Accountsda biophysical subset of the full Degrowth Accounts.
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1970s (Daly, 1973, 1977), although it traces its roots as far back as
the classical economists. It may be deﬁned as an economy where
the main biophysical stocks and ﬂows are stabilised, and where
material and energy ﬂows are kept within ecological limits. It is
worth stressing that the deﬁnition of a steady-state economy is
entirely biophysical. It does not refer to rates of GDP growth (or
other socio-economic indicators for that matter).
The idea of degrowth, on the other hand, largely emerged in
France as la decroissance, but has proliferated in recent years. Since
2007 there have been close to 130 academic articles published on
the topic, and seven special issues in peer-reviewed journals
(including two in this journal). Although deﬁnitions of degrowth
remain contentious, it has been deﬁned as an equitable down-
scaling of economic production and consumption that increases
human well-being and brings material and energy use within
ecological limits (Schneider et al., 2010; Kallis, 2011). While steady-
state economists tend to believemarketmechanisms can be used to
stabilise resource use, advocates of degrowth question increased
commodiﬁcation, and are more sceptical of capitalist institutions in
general. Moreover, advocates of degrowth tend to place more
emphasis on social outcomes than their steady-state counterparts.
Nevertheless, the two concepts are seen by many as complemen-
tary (Martínez-Alier, 2009; Kerschner, 2010; Kallis et al., 2012). If
resource use and waste emissions exceed ecosystem limits, then a
process of degrowth may be needed before a steady-state economy
can be established.
Both of these concepts, and the debates surrounding them, have
remained largely theoretical to date. This study attempts to answer
two important empirical questions: (i) How close are modern-day
national economies to a steady-state economy? (ii) Are countries
that are closer to a steady-state economy better or worse places to
live than those that are further away?
These questions are answered using the Degrowth Accounts, a
set of 16 biophysical and social indicators designed to measure
progress in the degrowth transition to a steady-state economy.
The indicators reﬂect Daly's biophysical deﬁnition of a steady-
state economy and the social goals of the degrowth move-
ment. The conceptual development of the Degrowth Accounts is
discussed in detail in two earlier publications (O'Neill, 2012a,
2015). The purpose of this article is to operationalise these
accounts.
The remainder of this article is organised as follows. Section 2
brieﬂy summarises the structure and indicators contained in the
Degrowth Accounts. Section 3 presents an empirical analysis of
these indicators for ~180 countries over a 10-year period. The
analysis shows how close countries are to the biophysical deﬁ-
nition of a steady-state economy (Section 3.1), how close coun-
tries are to the social goals of degrowth (Section 3.2), and the
relationship between social performance and both biophysical
stability and biophysical scale (Section 3.3). Section 4 then dis-
cusses the implications of the empirical analysis, in particular the
ﬁndings on growth, degrowth, and stability (Section 4.1), unem-
ployment (Section 4.2), and democracy (Section 4.3). This dis-
cussion is followed by a summary of the main contributions
(Section 4.4) and limitations (Section 4.5) of the study. Section 5
concludes.
2. The Degrowth Accounts
This section describes the Degrowth Accounts, including the
conceptual framework used to organise the indicators (Section 2.1),
their division into Biophysical Accounts (Section 2.2) and Social
Accounts (Section 2.3), and the speciﬁc indicators that are included
(Section 2.4).2.1. Conceptual framework
The 16 indicators in the Degrowth Accounts are organised using
Herman Daly (1977) “EndseMeans Spectrum”, which acts as a
unifying conceptual framework (Fig. 1). This framework was orig-
inally suggested by Meadows (1998) as the basis of an information
system for sustainable development. Such a framework is needed
to help ensure that the set of indicators is comprehensive, and to
interpret the relationships among indicators.
The EndseMeans Spectrum organises items in a hierarchy from
ultimate means (the natural resources that sustain life and all eco-
nomic transactions) to intermediate means (the factories, machines,
and skilled labour that transform natural resources into products
and services) to intermediate ends (the goals that the economy is
expected to deliver) to ultimate ends (those goals that are desired
only for themselves, and are not the means to achieve any other
end). The spectrum effectively divides the indicators into two
separate accounts: biophysical and social. The Biophysical Accounts
measure the use of means, while the Social Accounts measure
progress towards ends.
2.2. Biophysical Accounts
The Biophysical Accounts are constructed around Herman Daly's
deﬁnition of a steady-state economy (SSE).1 It is worth noting that
Daly's deﬁnition has evolved somewhat over time. While all of
Daly's deﬁnitions contain the same basic components, earlier def-
initions (e.g. Daly, 1973, 1977) tend to focus more on the idea of
constant stocks, while more recent deﬁnitions (e.g. Daly, 1996,
2008) tend to focus on constant ﬂows. Daly acknowledges this
evolution in one of his more recent deﬁnitions:
Following Mill we might deﬁne a SSE as an economy with
constant population and constant stock of capital, maintained
by a low rate of throughput that is within the regenerative and
assimilative capacities of the ecosystem… Alternatively, and
more operationally, we might deﬁne the SSE in terms of a
constant ﬂow of throughput at a sustainable (low) level, with
population and capital stock free to adjust to whatever size can
be maintained by the constant throughput beginning with
depletion and ending with pollution (Daly, 2008, p. 3).
D.W. O'Neill / Journal of Cleaner Production 108 (2015) 1213e1231 1215In general, Daly's deﬁnitions contain three components: stocks
(the absolute size of the economy in physical terms), ﬂows (the
material and energy throughput required to support the economy),
and scale (the size of the economy in relation to ecological limits).
The Biophysical Accounts include three stocks (people, livestock,
and built capital), three ﬂows (material use, energy use, and ma-
terial outﬂows), and a single measure of scale (discussed in Section
2.4.5). The result is a set of seven biophysical indicators.
In order to determine how close a country is to a steady-state
economy, two quantities are calculated: (1) the annual rate of
change of the above biophysical stocks and ﬂows, and (2) the scale
of the ﬂows in relation to ecosystem sources and sinks. If an
economy manages to achieve relatively constant stocks and ﬂows
over the analysis period, then it is referred to as a biophysically
stable economy. In this context, “stable” does not imply sustainable;
it simply indicates that resource demands are not changing over
time. If the economy also manages to maintain material ﬂows
within ecological limits, then it is referred to as a steady-state
economy. If, in addition to these biophysical criteria, the country
manages to achieve a high quality of life for its citizens, then it is
referred to as a socially sustainable steady-state economy. These
classiﬁcations are consistent with Daly's deﬁnitions, and earlier
conceptual work (O'Neill, 2015).
2.3. Social Accounts
Unlike the idea of a steady-state economy, which is deﬁned in
biophysical terms, degrowth is a multidimensional concept.
Demaria et al. (2013) identify six key sources fromwhich degrowth
draws inspiration: ecology, bioeconomics, critiques of develop-
ment, democracy, justice, and themeaning of life andwell-being. In
particular, degrowth draws on the culturalist critique of develop-
ment (e.g. Illich, 1973; Castoriadis, 1985; Latouche, 2009), which
questions the consumer society and its focus on progress, science,
and technology. To many, degrowth is a mot-obus (missile word)
that challenges the hegemony of growth and the idea of “devel-
opment” itself (Demaria et al., 2013).
Kallis et al. (2014) stress that degrowth is not just about less, but
about different. The authors state that degrowth “signiﬁes a society
with a smaller metabolism, but more importantly, a society with a
metabolism which has a different structure and serves new func-
tions” (p. 4). These new functions include sharing, simplicity,
conviviality, care, and autonomy, while structures to achieve these
functions include cooperatives, work sharing, public money, and
the commons (D'Alisa et al., 2014).
The Social Accounts are constructed around the stated goals of
the degrowth movement, as articulated in the declaration from the
ﬁrst international conference on degrowth, held in Paris in 2008
(Research & Degrowth, 2010). The declaration was the result of a
workshop entitled “Toward a Declaration on Degrowth”, whose
goal was to produce a statement that would not only reﬂect the
points of view of conference participants, but also articulate their
shared vision of the degrowth movement. Although the goals of
degrowth continue to be reﬁned, the Paris Declaration provides a
good starting point for analysis.
There are 24 individual social goals within the text of the
declaration, which have been grouped and reduced here to seven
general goals. These goals are human well-being, health, equality,
increased social capital, participatory democracy, the elimination of
poverty, and decreased working time. Two other goals have been
added to the seven goals from the Paris Declaration. The ﬁrst is low
unemployment, and the second is stable prices. The result is a set of
nine social indicators that measures the functioning of the socio-
economic system, and how effectively it delivers human well-
being.As discussed in O'Neill (2012a), there are two main reasons to
include unemployment in the Social Accounts. The ﬁrst is the well-
being beneﬁt of employment, and the second is the critique (e.g. by
Jackson, 2009) that degrowth will result in job losses. Although full
employment (as currently deﬁned) might no longer be a goal in a
degrowth future, it is still important to track the number of people
who are looking for a job but unable to ﬁnd one. Price stability is
also important to include as it is hard to imagine calling an econ-
omy “socially sustainable” if it does not have relatively stable prices.
An extensive survey by Shiller (1996) found that people have very
negative perceptions of inﬂation. These include concerns that
inﬂation lowers people's standard of living, allows opportunists to
take advantage of others, creates a social atmosphere that is
harmful to morale, and causes political instability.
2.4. Speciﬁc indicators
For each of the 16 relatively abstract indicators discussed above
(and shown in Fig. 1), one or more measurable proxies were chosen
based on the best data available for a large number of countries
(Table 1). The rationale for the selection of individual indicators is
described in detail in O'Neill (2012b). In general, only indicators
that were available for a large number of countries were consid-
ered. Two exceptions are the poverty and working time indicators,
where internationally comparable data were simply not available
for very many countries. In these cases it was necessary to use
proxies with data for fewer countries than the other indicators.
Ideally, consumption-based indicators that include the hidden
ﬂows embodied in trade would be used to measure material and
energy ﬂows within the Biophysical Accounts (O'Neill, 2015).
However, although indicators of the resource use associated with
ﬁnal consumption are becoming increasingly available (e.g. Peters
et al., 2011; Lenzen et al., 2012; Wiedmann et al., 2015), the un-
certainty associated with these is still higher than territorial mea-
sures. In order to maximise the number of countries covered, and
minimise the amount of error in the estimate of time trends,
relatively conventional measures were used for the ﬁrst instance of
the Degrowth Accounts. Material use and material outﬂows were
both measured using territorial indicators that do not account for
trade, while energy use and biophysical scale were measured using
indicators of “apparent consumption”. The latter indicators account
for trade by adding imports and subtracting exports, but do not
include the foreign resources required to produce traded goods.
Following O'Neill (2015), the Biophysical Accounts use aggregated
indicators that measure the quantity of resource use (e.g. tonnes of
materials and Joules of energy), as opposed to its quality.
Some of the indicators in the accounts, such as the measures of
population growth and price stability, are simple indicators where
data were readily available. Others, such as the measures of human
well-being and scale, are fuzzier concepts, and were more difﬁcult
to quantify. Although it is beyond the scope of this article to discuss
each of the 16 indicators in depth (see O'Neill, 2012b for this dis-
cussion), some comments are warranted on ﬁve of the speciﬁc in-
dicators: human well-being, equality, democracy, built capital, and
scale. These are the indicators where the choice of a proxywasmost
difﬁcult, or where additional information is needed to understand
the analysis that follows. For the full set of 16 indicators (and their
proxies), the reader is directed to Table 1.
2.4.1. Human well-being
The goal of increasing humanwell-being is central to degrowth,
and is often included in its deﬁnition. For example, Schneider et al.
(2010, p. 512) deﬁne degrowth as “an equitable downscaling of
production and consumption that increases humanwell-being and
enhances ecological conditions”, while Kallis (2011, p. 879)
Table 1
Indicators and the proxies used to measure them in the Degrowth Accounts.
Indicator Proxy Source Description
Human well-being Life satisfaction World Database of Happiness (Veenhoven, 2014) Response to the question “All things considered,
how satisﬁed are you with your life as a whole
these days?”
Health Healthy life expectancy at birth World Health Organization (United Nations, 2010) Number of years a newborn could expect to live
in full health, taking into account time lived in
less than full health due to disease and/or injury
Equality Gini coefﬁcient Standardized World Income Inequality Database
(Solt, 2009)
Measure of inequality in household disposable
income (i.e. income after tax transfers)
Social capital Index of interpersonal safety
and trust
Institute of Social Studies (ISS, 2011) Composite indicator that includes measures of
social trust and reported levels of crime
victimisation
Democracy Index of voice and
accountability
Worldwide Governance Indicators
(World Bank, 2011)
Composite indicator that measures the extent
to which a country's citizens are able to
participate in selecting their government, as
well as freedom of expression, freedom of
association, and a free media
Low unemployment Unemployment rate World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2014) Share of total labour force that is without work
but available for and seeking employment
Stable prices Inﬂation rate World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2014) Annual percentage change in the consumer
price index
No poverty Human Poverty Index (HPI-1) United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP, 2009)
Composite indicator thatmeasures deprivations
in three areas: health, education, and living
standards
Decreased working time Annual working hours International Labour Organization (ILO, 2011) Total number of hours actually worked during a
year per employed person
People D Human population United Nations Population Division
(United Nations, 2009)
Total population (both sexes combined)
Livestock D Livestock population Food and Agriculture Organization (FAOSTAT, 2011) Number of livestock units (a standardised unit
obtained by multiplying the number of animals
by a conversion factor that takes into account
the feed requirements of each type of animal)
Built capital D Night-time lights National Geophysical Data Center
(Elvidge et al., 2011)
Intercalibrated sum-of-lights, capturing both
changes in the intensity and area of nocturnal
lighting
Material use D Domestic material extraction Global Material Flows Database (SERI, 2010) Mass of domestically extracted biomass,
minerals, and fossil fuels
Energy use D Total primary energy supply Energy Information Administration (EIA, 2011) Apparent consumption of technical energy
Material outﬂows D CO2 emissions Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center
(Boden et al., 2010)
Total CO2 emissions from fossil-fuel burning,
cement production, and gas ﬂaring
Scale Ratio of per capita ecological
footprint to fair earthshare
Global Footprint Network (GFN, 2010) Compares a country's ecological footprint to the
area of biologically productive land that would
be available to each person if global biocapacity
were divided equally among all people
Note: The D symbol signiﬁes that a biophysical indicator is an annual rate of change.
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well-being stems from equality, relation and simplicity”.
There are a number of different approaches to deﬁning and
measuring human well-being, both subjective and objective. Sub-
jective approaches include the hedonic approach, which relates
well-being to the balance between positive and negative feelings
(Kahneman et al., 2004); the evaluative approach, which relates
well-being to an individual's appraisal of how his or her life is going
(Layard, 2010); and the eudaimonic approach, which relates well-
being to positive psychological functioning and the realisation of
potential (Ryan et al., 2008). Objective approaches, on the other
hand, include the preference satisfaction approach, which relates
well-being to the satisfaction of wants and desires (Harsanyi, 1997);
and the capabilities approach, which relates well-being to an in-
dividual's freedom to choose between different ways of living (Sen,
1993).
With such a wide array of different approaches, it is difﬁcult to
know which to use in the Social Accounts. Some authors, such as
Layard (2009), advocate using a single over-arching indicator to
measure well-being. Layard claims that a single indicator is
necessary in order to be able to evaluate policy options against one
another. Other authors, such as Michaelson et al. (2009), advocateusing a collection of indicators from multiple approaches in a sys-
tem of national accounts.
A single subjective measure of well-being was chosen as the
ultimate end in the Social Accounts, while objective measures like
health were included as intermediate ends. This choice was made
in part because of the causal relationship between indicators.
Although causality could go both ways, the evidence suggests that
health has more of an impact on subjective well-being than sub-
jective well-being does on health (Dolan et al., 2006; Deaton, 2008;
Graham, 2008).
Ideally, human well-being would be measured using an index
that combines a small number of indicators from the hedonic,
evaluative, and eudaimonic approaches. Such an index would
capture whether people were both “feeling good” and “doing well”.
However, the data needed to construct such an index were not
available for enough countries. In the interests of pragmatism,
human well-being has therefore been measured using a single
evaluative (i.e. life satisfaction) indicator.
The data used are from the World Database of Happiness
(Veenhoven, 2014). For most countries, these data are based on
responses to the question “All things considered, how satisﬁed are
you with your life as a whole these days?” Respondents were asked
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dissatisﬁed and 10 is satisﬁed.2
2.4.2. Equality
Greater social equity is an important objective of the degrowth
movement, and is often viewed as an end in itself, as evidenced by
the expression “degrowth for social equity” (Schneider et al., 2010;
my emphasis). According to Demaria et al. (2013, p. 209),
“degrowth implies an equitable redistribution of wealth within and
across the Global North and South, as well as between present and
future generations”. For some advocates, such as Paul Aries (2005),
the most important type of degrowth is degrowth in inequality.
There are two types of equity that are important to discuss. The
ﬁrst, which is emphasised in the Paris Declaration, is equity be-
tween nations, largely in terms of levels of resource use. The
declaration refers to “right-sizing” national economies, and sug-
gests that for wealthy nations this implies reducing per capita
ecological footprint to the sustainable global level, while for poorer
nations this implies increasing consumption to a “level adequate
for a decent life” (Research & Degrowth, p. 524).
The second type of equity, which is emphasised more by Daly
(1977, 2008) and advocates of a steady-state economy, is equity
within nations. Daly argues that without growth, the only way to
alleviate poverty is through redistribution, and that it is therefore
necessary to limit the range of income inequality within society.
Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) make even stronger arguments for
reducing income inequality. In their book The Spirit Level, they show
that societies with higher income inequality tend to have more
health and social problems, including higher crime rates, increased
mental illness, and decreased trust.
The focus in the Social Accounts is largely on the second type of
equity (i.e. equity within nations). The reason is that the type of
international “resource access equity” described in the Paris
Declaration is already accounted for in the Biophysical Accounts,
using the indicator of sustainable scale (see Section 2.4.5). Equity
between nations is also captured, to some degree, by the inclusion
of a measure of absolute poverty within the Social Accounts (see
Table 1).
Although equity within nations could theoretically be measured
using a variety of different variables (e.g. gender, education, or
happiness), income inequality has been used in the Social Accounts
because low income inequality is an established goal for a steady-
state economy, and data for this indicator are widely available.
The speciﬁc indicator used is the Gini coefﬁcient of net income,
which measures inequality in household disposable income (i.e.
income after taxes and transfers). The data used are from Solt's
(2009) Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID),
which provides the largest set of intercomparable data available.
2.4.3. Democracy
A deepening of democracy is another important goal of the
degrowth movement. A number of degrowth scholars claim that
the transition to a more ecologically sustainable society and the
transition to a more participatory and democratic society are
mutually supportive goals that must be achieved together (e.g.
Schneider et al., 2010). Cattaneo and Gavalda (2010) argue that
degrowth must be the outcome of a general transition towards a
more democratic and autonomous societydthe result of a collec-
tive decision for a better life. They stress that degrowthmust not be
an externally-imposed imperative, otherwise it could lead to some2 Most questions are of type O-SLW/c/sq/n/10/a (used in the World Values Sur-
vey) and O-SLW/c/sq/n/11/a (used in the Gallup World Poll). In some cases the scale
used was 1e10, but all results are standardised to a 0 to 10 scale.form of eco-dictatorship. Cattaneo et al. (2012) suggest that there is
a continuum of positions on the form of democracy needed for
degrowth: while some argue that degrowth would be possible in a
reformed parliamentary democracy, others call for a radical over-
haul of the political system and the establishment of direct
democracy.
References to the role of democracy in achieving a steady-state
economy are much harder to ﬁnd. It is a topic that Daly does not
really discuss, and where it is mentioned by other authors the focus
is often on whether a democratic system could lead to a steady-
state economy. As Victor (2008, p. 193) writes, “The dilemma for
policy makers is that the scope of change required for managing
without growth is so great that no democratically elected govern-
ment could implement the requisite policies without the broad-
based consent of the electorate. Even talking about them could
make a politician unelectable”. Nevertheless, Lawn (2005) argues
against critics who suggest that a steady-state economy could only
be accomplished under an authoritarian regime. He claims that a
government wishing to make the transition to a steady-state
economy would be democratically electable provided that people
could be convinced of the severity of the ecological crisis, the
desirability of a steady-state economy, and that their current free-
doms would be preserved.
Most existing indicators of the strength of democratic in-
stitutions are based solely on expert opinion, and do not differen-
tiate between countries at the top of the scale (i.e. those deemed
most democratic). One exception is the “voice & accountability”
indicator from the World Bank's (2011) World Governance In-
dicators. This indicator combines survey data with expert opinions
to measure “perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens
are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as
freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media”
(Kaufmann et al., 2010, p. 4). While it is questionable whether this
indicator adequately captures the deepening of democracy envis-
aged by many proponents of degrowth, it is the best indicator
available for a large number of countries, and it has therefore been
included in the Social Accounts.
2.4.4. Built capital
In his deﬁnition of a steady-state economy, Daly (1977) refers to
a constant stock of artefacts (i.e. built capital), which he deﬁnes as
including both producer goods and the total inventory of consumer
goods. Producer goods include the machines and other infrastruc-
ture like buildings, roads, and factories that contribute to the pro-
duction process, but do not become embodied in its output.
Consumer goods could theoretically include both durable goods
(e.g. automobiles, furniture, and household appliances) and non-
durable goods (e.g. food, beverages, clothing, and shoes). Howev-
er, many non-durable goods move through the economy so quickly
that it is probably more appropriate to think of them as a ﬂow than
as a stock.
Theoretically, it is possible to calculate whether the stock of built
capital is growing in quantity terms using data from Material Flow
Accounting studies (Eurostat, 2001, 2007). If direct material inputs
to the economy are larger than direct material outputs, then the
stock of built capital will increase. If the two quantities are equal,
the stock will not change. However, with the exception of a small
number of speciﬁc studies (e.g. Matthews et al., 2000; Pauliuk and
Müller, 2014; Wiedenhofer et al., 2015), national material ﬂow ac-
counts are currently not comprehensive enough, particularly on the
outﬂows side, to allow for the calculation of net additions to stock.
Therefore it is necessary to consider other methods for calculating
the change in the stock of built capital over time.
One approach would be to use traditional economic data such as
the World Bank's (2014) data on gross ﬁxed capital formation.
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change in the stock of built capital: (1) they measure the economic
value of the stock, not its physical quantity, and (2) they do not
account for depreciation. It is likely for these reasons that there is
no signiﬁcant correlation between the World Bank data and the
limited biophysical data that are available to measure net additions
to stock (O'Neill, 2012b).
The approach used in this analysis therefore relies on night-time
lights data. Nocturnal lighting is one of the hallmarks of humanity's
presence on earth, and the density of lighting has been shown to
match the density of infrastructure (Elvidge et al., 2007). In order to
calculate national trends, annual “sum-of-lights” data published by
Elvidge et al. (2011) were used. These data capture both changes in
the intensity and area of nocturnal lighting, based on satellite im-
agery from the National Geophysical Data Center. They therefore
capture both densiﬁcation and expansion of infrastructure. Change
in night-time lighting is a very rough approximation of change in
built capital, but one that is more consistent with the biophysical
deﬁnition of a steady-state economy than monetary measures such
as gross ﬁxed capital formation (O'Neill, 2012b).
2.4.5. Scale
Daly suggests that the maximum sustainable scale for the
economy should be determined based on either the capacity of
ecosystem sources to regenerate materials, or the capacity of
ecosystem sinks to assimilate wastesdwhichever limit is reached
ﬁrst (Daly, 2010). On the source side, only the ﬂow of renewable
materials (i.e. biomass and water) is relevant for assessing the scale
of economic activity, as these are the only materials that ecosys-
tems regenerate. The ﬂowof non-renewablematerials (i.e. minerals
and fossil fuels) is largely irrelevant on the source side, since eco-
systems do not regenerate these materials (except over geological
time periods), and hence there is no ecosystem threshold to
compare them to.
Human appropriation of net primary production (HANPP;
Vitousek et al., 1986; Haberl et al., 2007; O'Neill et al., 2007) is an
indicator that could be used to assess the scale of biomass use
relative to ecosystem sources. HANPP measures the amount of
biomass that human beings either (1) harvest, or (2) make un-
available through land cover change. It may be compared to the
potential net primary production that would be available in the
absence of human disturbance, to arrive at a measure of the
magnitude of human activity with respect to available biomass
ﬂows. The most detailed HANPP study to date (Krausmann et al.,
2013) indicates that human beings currently appropriate about
25% of global potential net primary production.
Daly (1991, p. 245) suggests that HANPP is “[p]robably the best
index of the scale of the human economy as a part of the
biosphere”. However, the problem with using HANPP as an indi-
cator of scale is that HANPP does not provide a clear sustainability
threshold. Although 100% appropriation would clearly be destruc-
tive because it would leave no resources for other species, levels
much lower than this may not be sustainable either (Haberl et al.,
2004). Based on the precautionary principle, Weterings and
Opschoor (1992) argue that the level of HANPP should be “small”
compared to natural processes, and propose 20% appropriation as a
sustainability threshold. However, this number is not based on
scientiﬁc criteria, and it is debatable how to set a meaningful lower
threshold (Haberl et al., 2004).
With respect to water, the blue water footprint (Hoekstra and
Hung, 2002; Hoekstra et al., 2011), which measures the consump-
tion of surface and ground water, is an indicator that could theo-
retically be used to assess the scale of water use. Gerten et al. (2013)
suggest that global blue water use should not exceed
1100e4500 billion m3 per year. However, there is currently nocomplementary measure of national water availability/regenera-
tion to compare the blue water footprint to.
While on the source side only the ﬂow of renewable resources is
relevant for assessing sustainability, the same is not true on the sink
side. On the sink side, all outﬂows must be considered. Given the
sheer number and wildly different characteristics of these mate-
rials, it might seem to be an almost impossible task to estimate
whether material outﬂows are within the assimilative capacity of
ecosystem sinks.
However, the dominant material outﬂow from industrial econ-
omies is CO2da pollutant with a clear link to a global environ-
mental problem, namely climate change. In a study of ﬁve
industrial economies, Matthews et al. (2000) found that CO2
emissions accounted for more than 80% of total material outﬂows
by weight, making the atmosphere the “largest dumping ground
for industrial wastes” (p. xii). As the authors explain, “Modern in-
dustrial economies, no matter how high-tech, are carbon-based
economies, and their pre-dominant activity is burning material”
(p. 23).
There is a growing consensus that global warming must be
limited to no more than 2 C above pre-industrial levels if
dangerous climate change is to be avoided. Based on a compre-
hensive probabilistic analysis, Meinshausen et al. (2009) conclude
that if cumulative global CO2 emissions were limited to 1000 Gt
over the period 2000e2050, the probability of exceeding 2 degrees
of warming would be 25% (i.e. relatively low). These, or other
similar data, could be used to construct national carbon budgets,
acknowledging that there are many different ways that “carbon
space” could be allocated among nations (Opschoor, 2010). Na-
tional carbon budgets could be compared to national CO2 emis-
sions data to arrive at an indicator of the scale of waste outﬂows in
comparison to ecosystem sinks. While such an approachwould not
account for all waste emissions from industrial economies, it
would relate the largest of these to an established limit on the sink
side.
While the separate indicators discussed above have a certain
appeal, there are problems with implementing them in practice,
particularlywith regard to establishing sustainability thresholds for
the source indicators. For the ﬁrst instance of the Degrowth Ac-
counts, a hybrid indicator that combines information on both
sources and sinks is therefore used in order to measure maximum
sustainable scale. This indicator is the ecological footprint
(Wackernagel and Rees, 1996). Although the method used to
calculate the footprint has been criticised by a number of authors
(van den Bergh and Verbruggen, 1999; Fiala, 2008; Wiedmann and
Barrett, 2010), it remains the only indicator of resource use and
waste emissions that has a clear sustainability threshold for indi-
vidual nations.
The ecological footprint measures the area of biologically pro-
ductive land that a country needs to produce the biomass it con-
sumes, and assimilate the CO2 emissions it generates. The footprint
does not include the ﬂow of non-renewable materials such as
minerals, but it does include fossil fuels in terms of the CO2 emis-
sions that are produced during their combustion. These emissions
are translated into the area of forested land necessary to sequester
the CO2 emitted (Ewing et al., 2010).
The ecological footprint may be compared to biocapacity (the
supply of biologically productive land) to arrive at a ratio of the
scale of economic activity in relation to what the environment can
sustain. At the national level, a country's footprint may either be
compared to its national biocapacity (the area of biologically pro-
ductive land within the country's borders), or to the concept of a
“fair earthshare” (the area of biologically productive land that
would be available to each person if global biocapacity were
divided equally among all people). “Fairness” in this sense is
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From a technical perspective there is no right or wrong answer
towhich of these two approaches should be taken. Either approach,
if adopted by all nations, would lead to ecological sustainability
(assuming we accept the ecological footprint as a meaningful
measure of sustainability). However, given the strong focus on
equity in the degrowth movement, it is probably more appropriate
to compare the ecological footprint to a fair earthshare. The Paris
Declaration explicitly mentions the goal of “right-sizing” national
economies, suggesting that “in countries where the per capita
footprint is greater than the sustainable global level, right-sizing
implies a reduction to this level within a reasonable timeframe”
(Research & Degrowth, 2010, p. 524). The ratio of per capita
ecological footprint to a fair earthshare has therefore been used as
the indicator of scale in the Biophysical Accounts.3 The data are
from the National Footprint Accounts, as published by the Global
Footprint Network (GFN, 2010).
3. Analysis
This section presents and analyses the data in the Degrowth
Accounts. Section 3.1 analyses the data in the Biophysical Accounts,
starting with the indicators used to measure biophysical stability,
followed by the indicator used to measure biophysical scale. Two
methods are employed to assess how close countries are to bio-
physical stability: (1) a multi-indicator categorisation approach,
and (2) an index of biophysical stability. Following this, Section 3.2
presents the data in the Social Accounts. To help assess the relative
social performance of different countries, the data are normalised
and aggregated to create an overall index of social performance.
Finally, Section 3.3 brings the Biophysical and Social Accounts
together to investigate the relationship between resource use and
social performance. Tests are performed to see whether there is any
relationship between biophysical stability and performance on
each of the social indicators, and then biophysical scale and each of
the social indicators. Multiple regression analysis is used to assess
whether the stability ﬁndings are robust to the inclusion of scale.
3.1. How close are countries to a steady-state economy?
To determine howclose countries are to a steady-state economy,
the seven indicators in the Biophysical Accounts are analysed over a
10-year time period (1997e2007), for 181 countries. This time
period was chosen to be long enough to observe trends, but not so
long as to introduce a signiﬁcant constraint on the number of
countries that could be analysed. Importantly, the analysis period
ends before the beginning of the global ﬁnancial crisis. This period
was chosen in part to avoid introducing an additional complicating
factor into the analysis of the relationship between biophysical
trends and social performance.
There are two types of indicators in the Biophysical Accounts:
(1) indicators that measure the rate of change of stocks and ﬂows,
and (2) indicators that measure the scale of the economy in relation
to the capacity of ecosystems. Although the ecological footprint is
primarily used as an indicator of scale in the Biophysical Accounts,
it is also included as a rate-of-change indicator for completeness.
3.1.1. Calculating rates of change
The rate of change for each of the seven biophysical indicators
was estimated over the 10-year analysis period (1997e2007) using3 A “fair earthshare” is equal to 1.8 global hectares per person in the year 2007.
This value is obtained by dividing global biocapacity by global population.log-linear regression, following a method suggested by Gujarati
(1995, pp. 169e171). The method uses all data points in the
period to calculate the compound annual rate of change, and is
therefore superior to simpler approaches that use only the end-
points. Following Equation (1), the compound annual rate of
change r was calculated as:
r ¼ ½expðmÞ  1  100 (1)
where m is the slope of the best-ﬁt line generated using ordinary
least squares regression, after log-transforming the data.
There is clearly value in having some measure of the level of
uncertainty in the trend. The standard measure of goodness-of-ﬁt
for a regression (R2) is of little use here, however, because R2 is
zero whenever the rate of change is zero (the desired state in a
steady-state economy). Therefore the standard error of the slope
was used to measure the uncertainty in the trend.
A high standard error in the slope could either indicate some
form of discontinuity in the data, or simply the absence of a
consistent trend. Either way, it could be argued that rates of change
with a high standard error should be excluded from the analysis of
how close countries are to biophysical stability. As a cut-off, all data
points with a standard error greater than 2% were excluded.4 For
the “cleanest” of the indicators (population) no data points were
excluded using this threshold, whereas for the “noisiest” of the
indicators (the ecological footprint), 13 data points were removed.
Two different approaches were used to assess how close coun-
tries are to biophysical stability: (1) a multi-indicator categorisation
approach, and (2) an index of biophysical stability.3.1.2. Categorisation approach
In the ﬁrst method, a country's performance on each of the
seven indicators was classiﬁed as either “degrowth”, “stable”, or
“growth” depending on the value of the indicator. In general, a rate
of change was classiﬁed as degrowth if it was less than 1% per
year, stable if it was between 1% and þ1%, and growth if was
greater than þ1% per year. The one exception is the rate of change
of populationwhere thresholds of 0.5% andþ0.5% were used, due
to the lower range and lower standard error for this indicator.
Each country was then placed into one of ﬁve categories based
on which of these three classiﬁcations dominated (Table 2). In
general, if four or more of the classiﬁcations were of one type (e.g.
“stable”) then the economy was categorised as that type (i.e. “sta-
ble”). Two shoulder categories (“partial degrowth” and “partial
growth”) were used to capture economies that fell between types.
A total of 174 countries were classiﬁed into these ﬁve groups, while
the remaining seven countries were classiﬁed as “mixed”. In gen-
eral, the “mixed” countries weremissing data for one ormore of the
indicators, which made it difﬁcult to categorise them.
Fig. 2 presents the rate-of-change data and categorisations for a
selection of the 181 countries in the Biophysical Accounts (see
Supplementary Data for all results). The results show that the vast
majority of countries in the world are biophysical growth econo-
mies. These countries account for roughly 80% of global population.
Moreover, there are 32 countries (accounting for 12% of global
population) where all seven biophysical indicators are increasing.
The world as a whole is also a growth economy, with high rates of
growth in ﬁve of the seven indicators.
There are 22 countries that have relatively stable stocks and
ﬂows, and another 24 close to this situation (i.e. countries cat-
egorised as either “partial degrowth” or “partial growth”). The4 The 2% cut-off is somewhat arbitrary, but matches the size of the groups that
were used to categorise economies, and serves to remove any extreme outliers.
Table 2
Categorisation of countries based on the rate of change of the seven stock and ﬂow indicators in the Biophysical Accounts.
Category Criteria Number of countries % of people
Degrowth 4 degrowth classiﬁcations 4 1.5
Partial Degrowth 5 stable or degrowth classiﬁcations 5 1.9
Stable 4 stable classiﬁcations 22 11.8
Partial Growth 5 stable or growth classiﬁcations 19 3.9
Growth 4 growth classiﬁcations 124 80.2
Mixed All others 7 0.7
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Europe, although a handful of Latin American countries also make
the list.
There is only one country in the world (Japan) that achieves
relative stability in all seven of the stocks and ﬂows, while ﬁve
countries (Denmark, France, Poland, Romania, and the US) achieve
stability in six out of the seven. Interestingly, the one indicator that
does not meet the stability criterion in the US is population, which
is growing at 1.1% per year.
There are four countries in the world (Germany, Guyana, Mol-
dova, and Zimbabwe) which achieve biophysical degrowth in the
majority of the indicators, and another ﬁve countries that straddle
the boundary between degrowth and stable (Lithuania, Slovakia,
Sweden, the Ukraine, and the UK). There are a total of seven
countries in the world that are either degrowing or stable in all
indicators (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Japan, Moldova, Romania,
and Zimbabwe). The UK performs well in general, achieving
degrowth or stability in six out of the seven indicators. The one
indicator that is increasing in the UK is the ecological footprint,
which is growing at 1.2% per year.3.1.3. Biophysical Stability Index
The second method that was used to assess how close countries
are to biophysical stability was to create a composite indicator (or
index) from the seven rate-of-change indicators. As discussed in
O'Neill (2012a), there are dangers associated with aggregating in-
dividual indicators together to create an index. In such a process,
information is inevitably lost, which may invite overly simplistic
policy conclusions. However, the largest dangerdthat of mixing
social and environmental objectives in a single measuredwas
avoided by creating a purely biophysical index in which the data
were normalised as percentage rates of change. The index adds
value by providing a single measure of stability, thus making the
results easier to interpret and communicate.
There were 137 countries for which clean data (i.e. standard
error <2%) were available for all seven of the indicators. The Bio-
physical Stability Index (BSI) was calculated by taking the arith-
metic mean of the absolute values of the indicators. In developing
this index, a number of different methods of aggregating the data
were explored (including taking the geometric and quadratic
mean). These different methods did not signiﬁcantly change the
results of the analysis, however, and so the simplest approach was
applied (the arithmetic mean) following standard index construc-
tion methods (OECD, 2008). Each of the indicators was weighted
equally.
The average of the absolute values was used, rather than the raw
values, in order to create an index that does not allow negative rates
of change on some indicators to cancel out positive rates of change
on others. Unlike the multi-indicator approach used to categorise
countries, the BSI does not distinguish between growing and
degrowing economies. It simplymeasures how close economies are
to biophysical stability. This approach is consistent with the deﬁ-
nition of a steady-state economy, which is concerned with stability
rather than growth or degrowth.The results of the index-based analysis (Table 3 and
Supplementary Data) paint a similar picture to the categorisation
analysis. The top ten countries on the BSI list are all identiﬁed as
biophysically stable economies using the categorisation method.
Both methods identify Japan as having the most biophysically-
stable economy in the world. Japan has the lowest BSI score and
is the only country that achieves a stable classiﬁcation on all seven
indicators. Although Japan tops the list, seven of the top ten
countries on the BSI list are in Europe. While Switzerland achieved
stability in only ﬁve of the seven indicators using the categorisation
method, it ﬁnishes second on the BSI list because these ﬁve rate-of-
change indicators are all very close to zero.
The country furthest away from biophysical stability is
Turkmenistan, followed by Vietnam and then Angola. The majority
of countries at the bottom of the list (i.e. those with the highest
rates of increase of stocks and ﬂows), are relatively poor developing
nations, although a few wealthier countries in the Middle East are
also found near the bottom. China has one of the highest rates of
biophysical growth in the world, ﬁnishing at number 125 on the
list.3.1.4. Scale and proximity to a steady-state economy
A steady-state economy is not just an economy where stocks
and ﬂows are stable over time. It is also an economy where the
level of ﬂows is within the carrying capacity of ecosystems. The
indicator of scale used in the Biophysical Accounts is the ratio of
per capita ecological footprint to a fair earthshare (FES), calculated
for the year 2007. Countries were placed into three categories
based on their performance on this indicator: small, medium, and
large (Table 4).
Roughly half of the global population live in countries with an
ecological footprint above a fair earthshare, while the other half live
in countries where the footprint is at or below a fair earthshare. A
relatively small number of people (10% of the global population)
live in countries where the footprint is roughly equal to a fair
earthshare. The countries with the lowest per capita ecological
footprint tend to be relatively poor countries in Africa and Asia,
while those with the highest footprint tend to be relatively wealthy
countries in the Middle East and Europe (Fig. 2). There is a diverse
mix of countries with a per capita ecological footprint close to a fair
earthshare, although the majority are in Africa, Latin America, and
Western Asia.
Having calculated indicators of both stability and scale, it is
now possible to assess whether there are any countries that are
close to a steady-state economy. The data reveal that the majority
of countries that have achieved biophysical stability have done so
at a level of resource use that is substantially above a fair
earthshare (Fig. 2). While we might refer to these as “bio-
physically stable economies”, they are not “steady-state econo-
mies” because their level of resource use is beyond what is
globally sustainable. There are only a handful of countries that
achieve something approaching both biophysical stability and
medium scale. These include Colombia, Cuba, Kyrgyzstan,
Romania, and South Africa.
Fig. 2. The Biophysical Accounts. Data are for a selection of countries. See Supplementary Data for full results. Note: “Change in Stocks” and “Change in Flows” data measure annual
percentage rates of change, calculated over the 10-year analysis period (1997e2007). “Scale” data measure the ratio of per capita ecological footprint to a fair earthshare for the year
2007. Rate-of-change values are classiﬁed as degrowth (yellow), stable (green), and growth (red). Scale values are classiﬁed as small (yellow), medium (green), and large (red). The
boundaries between colours are at 1% and þ1% for all rate-of-change indicators, with the exception of population, where 0.5% and þ0.5% are used instead. The boundaries
between colours for the scale indicator are at 0.8 and 1.2 times a fair earthshare. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web
version of this article.)
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Of the 181 countries included in the analysis, social data were
available for between 48 and 181 depending on the individual in-
dicator. In general, data were widely available for seven of the nine
social indicators. The two exceptions were the poverty indicator(which was only available for 131 relatively poor countries) and the
working time indicator (which was only available for 48 relatively
wealthy countries).
Where possible, the social indicators were calculated using data
covering the same 10-year period (1997e2007) as the biophysical
data. For some indicators, data were not available for this exact
Table 3
The Biophysical Stability Index (BSI) and sub-indicators. Data are for a selection of countries. See Supplementary Data for full results.
Country Change in stocks (%/year) Change in ﬂows (%/year) BSI
People Livestock Lights Materials Energy CO2 EF
1 Japan 0.11 0.72 0.96 0.03 0.49 0.15 0.26 0.39
2 Switzerland 0.61 0.15 0.11 0.40 0.09 0.36 1.39 0.44
3 France 0.58 0.87 0.13 0.31 0.85 0.08 0.53 0.48
4 Poland 0.12 0.21 1.10 0.59 0.40 0.64 0.50 0.51
5 Denmark 0.32 0.08 1.76 0.82 0.60 0.76 0.01 0.62
6 Romania 0.46 1.05 0.53 0.39 0.55 0.85 0.57 0.63
7 New Zealand 1.12 0.05 0.64 1.02 1.02 0.78 0.19 0.69
8 United States 1.06 0.15 0.95 0.51 0.64 0.64 0.98 0.70
9 Italy 0.42 1.14 0.62 0.07 1.08 0.74 1.12 0.74
10 Hungary 0.26 0.92 1.43 1.81 0.99 0.70 0.03 0.88
11 Paraguay 2.01 0.24 0.41 0.97 0.37 0.70 1.48 0.88
12 Germany 0.06 1.11 1.74 2.38 0.14 1.02 0.03 0.93
13 Kyrgyzstan 1.18 1.49 0.96 0.78 0.92 1.27 0.18 0.97
14 Belgium 0.40 2.10 2.00 0.05 0.45 1.22 0.93 1.02
15 Netherlands 0.51 1.92 1.79 0.24 1.51 0.08 1.14 1.03
16 Colombia 1.62 0.52 1.48 2.03 0.79 0.35 0.62 1.06
17 United Kingdom 0.43 1.81 1.44 2.37 0.05 0.09 1.22 1.06
18 Uruguay 0.15 0.91 2.51 2.64 0.06 0.96 0.21 1.06
19 Lebanon 1.46 1.53 1.15 1.06 1.57 0.49 0.26 1.07
20 Norway 0.67 0.42 0.05 0.71 0.49 3.05 2.19 1.08
… … … … … … … … … …
125 China 0.73 0.49 4.99 5.87 9.12 7.75 3.46 4.63
… … … … … … … … … …
128 Albania 0.18 1.44 6.20 6.09 3.88 10.55 5.49 4.83
129 Sierra Leone 3.31 3.24 9.12 4.17 4.06 9.82 1.16 4.98
130 Chad 3.48 2.85 4.66 2.48 3.10 16.83 2.78 5.17
131 Benin 3.30 3.18 1.74 2.27 11.30 12.36 3.00 5.31
132 Sudan 2.18 2.21 6.58 2.41 12.22 10.54 2.00 5.45
133 Oman 1.79 2.70 5.75 2.59 7.16 9.96 8.24 5.46
134 Trinidad & Tobago 0.37 6.40 3.73 8.68 8.66 6.68 4.02 5.50
135 Angola 2.94 1.38 6.50 5.79 8.27 13.24 3.80 5.99
136 Vietnam 1.35 4.03 7.99 7.70 9.58 10.98 5.39 6.72
137 Turkmenistan 1.42 9.35 3.10 9.52 14.41 4.70 5.53 6.86
Note: Data show annual percentage rates of change for the seven stock and ﬂow indicators, as well as the BSI, and are calculated over the 10-year analysis period (1997e2007).
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were used. If data were available for multiple years within the
analysis period, then the average value over the period was
calculated.
On their own, the nine indicators in the Social Accounts are
difﬁcult to interpret, particularly since some of them (e.g. the in-
dicators of democracy and social capital) are dimensionless indices.
Without some kind of summary indicator that normalises and ag-
gregates the data, it is difﬁcult to say how countries are performing
overall on the social objectives described in the Paris Declaration.
In order to assess the relative social performance of different
countries, an index based on the social indicators was created. The
index includes all of the social indicators, with the exception of the
poverty and working time indicators, which were available for a
much smaller number of countries than the others.
The Social Performance Index (SPI) was calculated for countries
where all seven of the included indicators were available. The index
was calculated by normalising each indicator so that it was on a
zero to ten scale (with zero representing the worst score and ten
representing the best score for the indicator), and then taking the
arithmetic mean of these seven values. Standard index constructionTable 4
Categorisation of countries based on the scale of resource use (per capita ecological
footprint) relative to a fair earthshare.
Category Criteria Number of countries % of people
Small <0.8 FES 48 38.0
Medium 0.8 to 1.2 FES 34 10.4
Large >1.2 FES 98 51.6methods were used (OECD, 2008), and an equal weight was given
to each indicator.
There were 108 countries for which all seven social indicators
were available. Table 5 presents the SPI and normalised sub-
indicators for a selection of these countries (see Supplementary
Data for all results). The countries that achieve the highest scores
on the SPI are almost exclusively wealthy European nations, with
Switzerland, Denmark, and Iceland topping the list. Nine of the top
ten social performers (and sixteen of the top twenty) are European
countries. Japan is the only non-European country to ﬁnish in the
top ten. By contrast, the countries that achieve the lowest scores on
the SPI are almost exclusively poor African nations, with Zambia
and Kenya ﬁnishing at the bottom of the list. Nine of the bottom ten
social performers (and fourteen of the bottom twenty) are African
countries. Iraq is the only country in the bottom ten that is not
located in Africa.
3.3. Resource use and social performance
Having calculated indicators to measure both biophysical sta-
bility and biophysical scale, as well as indicators to measure per-
formance on the main social objectives described in the Paris
Declaration, it is now possible to use these indicators to investigate
the social performance of countries that are closer to a steady-state
economy, in comparison to those that are further away.
3.3.1. Visualising country performance
An earlier article (O'Neill, 2012a) suggested plotting biophysical
scale versus individual rate-of-change indicators as a way to visu-
alise how close countries are to a steady-state economy. Such an
Table 5
The Social Performance Index (SPI) and sub-indicators. Data are for a selection of countries. See Supplementary Data for full results.
Country Life Sat. Health Gini Trust Voice Unemp. Inﬂat. SPI
1 Switzerland 9.14 9.72 8.35 10.00 9.71 7.94 8.76 9.09
2 Denmark 9.54 8.89 10.00 9.35 10.00 6.98 7.12 8.84
3 Iceland 9.38 9.44 9.07 9.68 9.75 8.73 5.46 8.79
4 Norway 8.87 9.17 9.49 8.82 9.87 7.86 7.25 8.76
5 Sweden 8.80 9.44 9.87 7.84 9.87 5.76 8.07 8.52
6 Netherlands 8.35 9.17 8.95 8.11 9.94 7.81 6.93 8.46
7 Finland 8.93 8.89 9.41 9.09 9.98 4.65 7.76 8.39
8 Luxembourg 8.52 9.17 8.71 7.14 9.63 8.19 6.97 8.33
9 Austria 8.38 8.89 8.86 7.82 9.28 7.36 7.39 8.28
10 Japan 6.48 10.00 6.99 9.30 7.98 7.15 10.00 8.27
11 Belgium 7.94 8.89 8.96 8.82 9.36 5.19 7.26 8.06
12 New Zealand 8.17 9.17 6.41 8.47 9.97 6.59 6.88 7.95
13 Ireland 8.43 9.17 7.19 9.00 9.32 6.61 5.85 7.94
14 Germany 7.57 9.17 8.49 8.02 9.40 4.70 7.88 7.89
15 Malta 7.55 8.89 8.29 8.53 8.91 5.64 6.87 7.81
16 Canada 8.42 9.17 7.25 7.38 9.70 5.49 6.99 7.77
17 Cyprus 7.34 8.33 8.46 8.16 8.28 7.20 6.51 7.76
18 Australia 8.64 9.44 7.25 7.04 9.45 6.07 6.34 7.75
19 United Kingdom 7.61 8.89 6.25 7.62 9.23 6.58 7.85 7.72
20 France 6.67 9.17 8.57 7.23 8.82 4.48 7.59 7.51
… … … … … … … … … …
24 United States 8.13 8.33 5.43 6.72 8.96 6.87 6.64 7.30
… … … … … … … … … …
39 China 6.14 7.22 4.73 8.14 0.33 7.82 8.50 6.13
… … … … … … … … … …
99 Ethiopia 2.45 2.78 6.26 4.79 1.64 3.37 4.80 3.73
100 Burkina Faso 2.71 0.83 1.24 0.84 3.80 9.24 7.10 3.68
101 Malawi 5.95 1.11 3.08 4.31 3.90 5.27 1.61 3.60
102 Cote d'Ivoire 2.87 1.94 2.79 1.94 1.26 7.48 6.43 3.53
103 Botswana 3.31 2.50 0.43 4.71 6.93 2.07 3.84 3.40
104 South Africa 5.28 2.22 0.00 2.06 7.12 0.93 4.93 3.22
105 Cameroon 1.97 1.39 2.29 0.52 1.70 6.67 7.06 3.09
106 Iraq 3.26 3.89 6.48 3.70 0.00 1.51 1.16 2.86
107 Kenya 1.50 2.22 1.92 0.29 3.75 4.47 3.76 2.56
108 Zambia 3.79 0.00 1.16 3.55 3.79 3.63 1.39 2.47
Note: All results are normalised to a 0e10 scale, where 10 is the best score achieved, and 0 is the worst.
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two-dimensional plot: desirable growth, undesirable growth, desir-
able degrowth, and undesirable degrowth. Countries at the centre of
the plot (where the two axes meet) would approach a steady-state
economy for the indicators considered.
In Fig. 3, countries are plotted using this method and the
ecological footprint data from the Biophysical Accounts. The results
suggest a rather uneven distribution of countries among the four
quadrants. In general, there are more countries experiencing un-
desirable growth than desirable growth, and almost no countries
experiencing degrowth (whether desirable or not).
In Fig. 3, life satisfaction data from the Social Accounts are also
included by colour-coding the points for each country. Countries
are coded as happy (life satisfaction greater than 7 out of 10),
relatively happy (6e7), relatively unhappy (5e6), and unhappy (less
than 5). The four-quadrant plot clearly suggests a correlation be-
tween biophysical scale and human well-being. Countries with a
large per capita ecological footprint tend to score highly on life
satisfaction (most of the blue points are near the top of the plot),
while countries with a small per capita footprint tend to score
poorly (most of the grey points are near the bottom). In this plot,
however, there is no obvious relationship between the rate of
change of per capita ecological footprint and life satisfaction.
It is worth noting that Fig. 3 only considers a single biophysical
indicator (the ecological footprint) and a single social indicator (life
satisfaction). The next two subsections investigate the relationship
between resource use and social performance across multiple in-
dicators. Statistical techniques are used to test for a relationship
between biophysical stability and social performance, and then testfor a relationship between biophysical scale and social perfor-
mance. Finally, a test is performed to see whether biophysical sta-
bility is robust to the inclusion of scale.
3.3.2. Biophysical stability and social performance
To test for a relationship between biophysical stability and social
performance, countries were placed into four groups based on their
performance on the biophysical rate-of-change indicators. A com-
parison of means was then performed to test whether there was a
statistically signiﬁcant difference between the groups in terms of
their average scores on the nine social indicators.
Countries were placed into the following groups: partial
degrowth, stable, partial growth, and growth. These groups corre-
spond to the groups used in the earlier rate-of-change catego-
risation (Table 2), except that the “degrowth” and “partial
degrowth” groups were merged into a single “partial degrowth”
group due to the small number of countries in these two groups.
The four resulting groups include 174 of the 181 countries in the
accounts. The seven countries categorised as “mixed” were not
included in the analysis. The comparison of means was performed
using all available data for each of the nine social indicators, and
statistical signiﬁcance was tested using analysis of variance
(ANOVA).
In general, countries classiﬁed as biophysically stable perform
better on the social indicators than countries in the two shoulder
groups (“partial degrowth” and “partial growth”), who in turn
perform better than countries in the “growth” group (Fig. 4). There
is a statistically signiﬁcant relationship between the biophysical
stability groups and ﬁve of the social indicators (life satisfaction,
Fig. 3. The rate of change of ecological footprint vs. biophysical scale (as measured by the ratio of per capital ecological footprint to a fair earthshare). In this visualisation, a steady-
state economy is reached at the centre of the plot, where the two axes intersect. Points are colour-coded according to life satisfaction. (For interpretation of the references to colour
in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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poverty). The strongest relationships involve the Gini coefﬁcient
and voice & accountability indicators.
Interestingly, countries in the two shoulder groups (“partial
degrowth” and “partial growth”) perform similarly to each other onFig. 4. Means plots (with standard errors) for the nine indicators in the Social Accounts, grou
top is ‘good’. Note: PD ¼ Partial Degrowth, S ¼ Stable, PG ¼ Partial Growth, G ¼ Growth. F is t
signiﬁcant.the social indicators. In fact, there is not a statistically signiﬁcant
difference between the two shoulder groups for any of the social
indicators. By contrast, there is almost always a signiﬁcant differ-
ence between the “stable” group and the “growth” group. The
biophysically stable economies have higher life satisfaction, betterped according to biophysical stability. The vertical axis is oriented so that a value at the
he ANOVA F-statistic for the comparison of means, ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, ‘ns’ not
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the growing economies. Average life satisfaction in biophysically
stable economies is a full point higher than in growing economies
(6.8 versus 5.7 on the original ten-point scale), while healthy life
expectancy is almost ten years longer (68 versus 58 years).
Finally, there is no statistically signiﬁcant relationship between
biophysical growth and the unemployment rate. The average un-
employment rate in biophysically stable economies (7.9%) is almost
the same as the average unemployment rate in growing economies
(7.3%). The variation in the unemployment rate within the four
groups is greater than the variation among them.
3.3.3. Biophysical scale and social performance
In order to investigate whether there is a relationship between
biophysical scale and social performance, a second comparison of
means was performed. This time countries were classiﬁed into four
groups based on their performance on the biophysical scale indi-
cator (i.e. the ratio of per capita ecological footprint to a fair
earthshare). The groups were small (less than 0.8 times a fair
earthshare), medium (0.8e1.2 times a fair earthshare), large
(1.2e2.5 times a fair earthshare), and very large (greater than 2.5
times a fair earthshare). These groups correspond to the groups
used in the previous scale categorisation (Table 4), except that the
“large” group was split into two separate groups due to the sizeable
number of countries it contains. The four resulting groups include
180 of the 181 countries in the accounts.
In general, the larger a country's per capita ecological footprint,
the better its social performance (Fig. 5). There is a statistically
signiﬁcant relationship between biophysical scale (as measured by
per capita ecological footprint) and all nine of the social indicators.Fig. 5. Means plots (with standard errors) for the nine indicators in the Social Accounts, grou
is ‘good’. Note: S ¼ Small, M ¼ Medium, L ¼ Large, VL ¼ Very Large. F is the ANOVA F-statThe strongest relationship is with healthy life expectancy, while the
weakest relationship is with unemployment.
The relationship between biophysical scale and four of the in-
dicators (life satisfaction, healthy life expectancy, voice &
accountability, and poverty) appears to be monotonic, with higher
biophysical scale associated with better scores on these indicators.
On average, countries with a “very large” ecological footprint enjoy
life satisfaction valuesmore than two full points higher, and healthy
life expectancies almost 20 years longer, than countries with a
“small” footprint.
For three of the indicators (Gini coefﬁcient, safety & trust, and
unemployment), there appears to be a V-shaped relationship
between scale and social performance. In all three cases the best
performance is achieved at very large scale, and the worst per-
formance is achieved at medium scale. For example, the average
Gini coefﬁcient is almost 12 points lower in countries with very
large scale than in countries with medium scale, while the average
unemployment rate is close to 3% lower. Interestingly, the un-
employment rate in countries with small scale is also relatively
low.
For the two remaining social indicators (inﬂation and working
hours) the best performance is achieved at very large scale, with
worse (and statistically indistinguishable) performance at the other
scales. For example, the inﬂation rate is about 3% lower on average
in countries with very large scale than countries with medium
scale, while average working hours are almost 200 h less per year.
Unfortunately there are no working hours data available for
countries with small biophysical scale (and only six countries at
medium scale), which limits the conclusions that can be drawn
from this indicator.ped according to biophysical scale. The vertical axis is oriented so that a value at the top
istic for the comparison of means, ***p < .001, **p < .01.
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The results thus far suggest a relationship between social per-
formance and both biophysical stability and biophysical scale.
Countries where stocks and ﬂows are relatively constant appear to
be better places to live than countries where stocks and ﬂows are
either growing or degrowing. At the same time, countries with a
larger per capita ecological footprint appear to be better places to
live than countries with a smaller per capita footprint. An impor-
tant question that remains to be answered is whether biophysical
stability is actually a signiﬁcant predictor of social performance, or
just a correlate of biophysical scale.
Multiple regression analysis was used to address this question.
Each social indicator was regressed against both the indicator of
scale (per capita ecological footprint) and the Biophysical Stability
Index. Two regression models were ﬁtted to the data for each of the
social indicators: a linear model of the form y ¼ b0 þ b1x1 þ b2x2,
and a semi-logarithmic model of the form y ¼ b0 þ b1ln(x1) þ
b2ln(x2). Of the two models, the one with the highest R2 value and
the most normally-distributed residuals was chosen as the more
accurate reﬂection of the relationship between social performance
and resource use.
The results show that the scale indicator (per capita ecological
footprint) is a statistically signiﬁcant predictor of all of the social
indicators (Table 6). With larger scale, comes better social perfor-
mance. However, for three of the social indicators (unemployment
rate, inﬂation rate, and working hours), the regression models
explain very little of the variance in the data. The unemployment
rate, in particular, appears to be almost completely unrelated to
biophysical quantities.
There are four social indicators (life satisfaction, healthy life
expectancy, voice & accountability, and poverty) where both scale
and stability are signiﬁcant to the model. The t-value for scale is
larger than the t-value for stability in each model, but stability is a
signiﬁcant predictor of performance nonetheless. In all four cases,
greater biophysical stability (i.e. a lower rate of change of stocks andTable 6
Multiple regression models for all social indicators as a function of scale (per capita ecol
Dependent variable Best-ﬁt Model N Adj. R
Life satisfaction Log 123 0.396
Healthy life expectancy Log 133 0.597
Gini coefﬁcient Linear 121 0.313
Interpersonal safety and trust Linear 121 0.358
Voice and accountability Log 133 0.517
Unemployment rate Linear 114 0.027
Inﬂation rate Linear 114 0.198
Human Poverty Index Log 100 0.466
Working hours Linear 44 0.219
Note: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, ‘ns’ not signiﬁcant. N is the number of data points i
model. All regression coefﬁcients b are standardised.ﬂows) is associatedwith better social performance. For both healthy
life expectancy and voice & accountability, more than 50% of the
variance in the data is explained by the two biophysical indicators.
Interestingly, the four indicators where stability is signiﬁcant
are also the four indicators where the best ﬁt for scale is semi-
logarithmic. For these indicators, it may be the case that as per
capita resource use increases, the stability of stocks and ﬂows be-
comes a more important determinant of social performance than
additional resource use. For the two remaining social indicators
(Gini coefﬁcient and safety& trust), scale is signiﬁcant to themodel,
but stability is not.
4. Discussion
This section discusses the main implications of the empirical
results. These include the general ﬁndings regarding growth,
degrowth, and stability (Section 4.1), as well as the ﬁndings on
unemployment (Section 4.2) and democracy (Section 4.3). The
main contributions of the study are summarised in Section 4.4,
while its limitations are discussed in Section 4.5.
4.1. Growth, degrowth, and stability
In his most famous work, The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith
expounds the virtues of the “progressive state” (economic growth),
and laments the alternative of the “stationary” or “declining” state.
He writes:
It deserves to be remarked, perhaps, that it is in the progressive
state, while the society is advancing to the further acquisition,
rather than when it has acquired its full complement of riches,
that the condition of the labouring poor, of the great body of the
people, seems to be the happiest and the most comfortable. It is
hard in the stationary, and miserable in the declining state. The
progressive state is in reality the cheerful and the hearty state toogical footprint) and stability (Biophysical Stability Index).
2 Independent variable b t
Constant 20.30 ***
PC EF 0.526 6.26 ***
BSI 0.174 2.07 *
Constant 35.71 ***
PC EF 0.655 10.45 ***
BSI 0.209 3.33 **
Constant 19.46 ***
PC EF 0.571 6.38 ***
BSI 0.003 0.03 ns
Constant 14.67 ***
PC EF 0.645 7.95 ***
BSI 0.145 1.79 ns
Constant 1.24 ns
PC EF 0.570 8.30 ***
BSI 0.253 3.68 ***
Constant 11.98 ***
PC EF 0.221 2.12 *
BSI 0.174 1.67 ns
Constant 12.71 ***
PC EF 0.519 5.39 ***
BSI 0.170 1.77 ns
Constant 5.80 ***
PC EF 0.547 7.22 ***
BSI 0.308 4.06 ***
Constant 19.02 ***
PC EF 0.481 3.13 **
BSI 0.047 0.31 ns
n each regression and R2 is the adjusted coefﬁcient of determination for the best-ﬁt
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declining, melancholy (Smith, 1776, p. 120).
However, in contrast to Smith's views, the results reported here
suggest that it is much better to live in a society that has acquired
“the full complement of riches”, and has stopped increasing these
riches, than to live in a society that is still “advancing to further
acquisition”. Countries with a larger per capita ecological footprint
are, in general, better places to live than countries with a smaller
per capita ecological footprint. Greater per capita resource use is
associated with higher life satisfaction, better health, greater
equality, more social capital, stronger democracy, less poverty,
fewer working hours, anddto some extentdlower inﬂation.
Furthermore, although the empirical analysis shows that the
level of resource use is a more signiﬁcant predictor of social per-
formance than its rate of change, the rate of change of stocks and
ﬂows predicts social performance as well, but not in the direction
suggested by Smith. Countries with stable stocks and ﬂows tend to
have higher life satisfaction, longer healthy life expectancies,
stronger democracies, and less poverty than those with either
increasing or decreasing stocks and ﬂows, all else being equal.
These ﬁndings should be interpreted with some caution, how-
ever. They suggest that, given two countries with a similar level of
resource use, we would expect social performance to be higher in
the one where resource use was more stable over time. They also
suggest that, given two countries with stable resource use, we
would expect social performance to be higher in the one with
greater resource use. They do not necessarily suggest that it is
possible to substitute for a higher level of resource use simply by
stabilising stocks and ﬂows.
The empirical analysis suggests that there are very few countries
experiencing biophysical degrowth, and thus it is difﬁcult to draw
any ﬁrm conclusions about the social performance of degrowing
economies. Nevertheless, the data suggest that countries experi-
encing partial growth and countries experiencing partial degrowth
are indistinguishable from each other in terms of their social per-
formance. Stability appears to be more important for achieving
positive social outcomes than either growth or degrowth.
This tentative ﬁnding has both positive and negative implica-
tions for advocates of degrowth. On the one hand, it suggests that
degrowthmay be noworse than growth (from a social perspective),
and thus there is less to fear from a degrowth transition to a steady-
state economy than people might think. On the other hand, if lower
social performance is associated with degrowth thanwith stability,
then it may still be difﬁcult to ﬁnd support for a degrowth transi-
tion to a steady-state economy, especially if the end point of that
transition is a much lower level of resource use than wealthy
countries enjoy at present.
The empirical analysis identiﬁed around twenty countries that
have achieved relatively stable stocks and ﬂows over the 10-year
analysis period. However, the majority of these countries have
done so at a level of resource use that is well above a fair earthshare.
While we might refer to these as “biophysically stable economies”,
they are not “steady-state economies” because the level of resource
use that they enjoy is above what is globally sustainable.
Research on social metabolism (e.g. Fischer-Kowalski and Haberl,
2007; Krausmann et al., 2008; Haberl et al., 2011) describes two
major transitions that have occurred (and are still occurring) in
human societies. The ﬁrst is the transition from a hunter-gatherer
regime to an agrarian regime, and the second is the transition
from an agrarian regime to an industrial regime. Although it is
tempting to view the biophysically stable economies identiﬁed in
the analysis as potential models of sustainability, these economies
may simply be experiencing the completion (or ﬁnal stages) of thetransition to an industrial regime. Biophysical stability at a high level
of resource may be “business as usual”dthe inevitable outcome of
the transition to an industrial society. If this is the case, then a third
major transition is still required in these countries in order to reduce
resource use to a sustainable level. This could either be the
degrowth transition to a steady-state economy, or the advent of a
“green economy” (UNEP, 2011) powered by more efﬁcient technol-
ogies. If one believes that decoupling humanwell-being from GDP is
relatively hard, but decoupling GDP from resource use is relatively
easy, then the solution is the green economy. If, however, one be-
lieves that the reverse is true, then degrowth is the solution.
The fact that around twenty countries have managed to sta-
bilise resource use, even if it is at a level that is too high, is an
important ﬁnding. It suggests that continuous growth is not
needed in order to maintain a high level of social performance. A
biophysically stable economy can also be socially sustainable.
Furthermore, as Daly (1977) points out, the ﬁrst step in achieving a
steady-state economy is to stabilise resource use at existing or
nearby levels. The second step is to decide whether the optimum
level of resource use is greater than or less than the present level.
In Daly's words, “[W]e cannot go into reverse without ﬁrst coming
to a stop” (p. 52).
4.2. Unemployment and growth
Another very interesting ﬁnding is that the unemployment
rate is largely unrelated to the rate of change of biophysical stocks
and ﬂows. In some ways this ﬁnding ﬂies in the face of conven-
tional economic theory which posits that economic growth is
necessary to prevent rising unemployment. It calls into question
the concern that the stabilisation of consumer demand, coupled
with steadily increasing labour productivity, would inevitably
lead to job losses in a steady-state economy unless some pre-
ventive action were taken. This concern has led a number of
authors to suggest that special policies would be needed to
maintain full employment in a steady-state economy. These
include working time reduction (Lintott, 2004; Schor, 2005; Kallis
et al., 2013), a job guarantee (Lawn, 2004; Alcott, 2013), or the
shift towards lower productivity sectors of the economy (Jackson
and Victor, 2011; Nørgård, 2013).
Some countries, such as Germany, already use the sorts of pol-
icies advocated for a steady-state economy to prevent unemploy-
ment from rising (e.g. working time reduction; Crimmann et al.,
2010). Others, such as Japan, may simply have different cultural
values that discourage businesses from laying off workers during an
economic downturn (The Economist, 2006). Interestingly, it would
seem that subjective measures such as life satisfaction are easier to
predict across a wide range of countries than objective indicators
like the unemployment rate. All in all, these ﬁndingsmay give some
support to ecological economist Blake Alcott's claim that “Ulti-
mately society, not the economy, determines how many people are
out of work” (Dietz and O'Neill, 2013, p. 127).
It is important to note, however, that the ﬁndings for unem-
ployment are based on a cross-sectional analysis. Further research
needs to be done using time series data for individual countries to
test, for example, whether there is a biophysical equivalent of
Okun's Law (the observed relationship between change in GDP and
change in unemployment).
4.3. Democracy and degrowth
Another interesting ﬁnding of the empirical analysis is that
countries with stable stocks and ﬂows tend to have stronger
democratic institutions. These results challenge the idea that a
steady-state economy could only be achieved under an
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results suggest that biophysical stability and participatory de-
mocracymay be compatible aims, which is good news for achieving
a socially sustainable steady-state economy.
In part, the ﬁndings also support the view held by many
degrowth scholars that the transition to a more ecologically sus-
tainable society and the transition to a more democratic society
are mutually supportive goals (Cattaneo and Gavalda, 2010;
Schneider et al., 2010; Cattaneo et al., 2012). The problem for
advocates of degrowth, however, is that it is not just biophysical
stability and strong democracy that seem to go hand in hand, but
also biophysical scale and strong democracy. Strong democracies
are characterised by both stable stocks and ﬂows, and high
resource use. This creates something of a Catch-22: while strong
democratic institutions might be compatible with a steady-state
economy (once achieved), such institutions could also make the
degrowth transition to such an economy less likely to occur in the
ﬁrst place.
Of course, the results presented here are derived from an anal-
ysis of the relationship between resource use and social perfor-
mance in countries where the main aim is economic growth. This
relationship could look very different in a society where economic
growth was no longer part of the social imagination. Matthey
(2010) presents some experimental evidence to support this idea.
She shows that the less people aspire towards a high level of con-
sumption, the smaller the loss in their well-being when material
aspirations are not fulﬁlled. She suggests that degrowth would be
easier to achieve if people's material aspirations were moderated,
for example by limiting advertising.
4.4. Contributions of this study
This study makes a number of important contributions. Draw-
ing on previous conceptual work (O'Neill, 2012a, 2015), it trans-
lates Daly (2008) biophysical deﬁnition of a steady-state economy,
and the stated social goals of the degrowth movement (Research &
Degrowth, 2010), into a set of 16 measureable indicators. In doing
so it presents the ﬁrst empirical analysis of how close countries are
to a socially sustainable steady-state economy, and provides a
common information system to measure important elements of
both degrowth and a steady-state economy. This information
system builds on Kerschner's (2010) work showing the comple-
mentary nature of these two ideas. The biophysical indicators aim
to measure what would be held steady in a steady-state economy,
while the socials indicators aim tomeasurewhat would not be held
steady, but would be encouraged to improve over time.
The study offers two novel methods to assess how close
different economies are to the biophysical stability objective of a
steady-state economy: (1) a multi-indicator categorisation
approach, and (2) a composite indicator. These methods show
which economies are growing, which are degrowing, andwhich are
stable, based on the rates of change of seven biophysical indicators.
The study also provides a composite indicator to measure progress
towards the social objectives of the degrowth movement, as arti-
culated in the Paris Declaration.
Perhaps most importantly, though, the study compares the so-
cial performance of countries that are closer to, and further away
from, the idea of a steady-state economy. It suggests that a bio-
physically stable economy can also be socially sustainable, although
the level of resource use accompanying stability may be problem-
atic. Finally, the analysis suggests important relationships between
individual biophysical and social indicators. These include a posi-
tive relationship between strong democracies and biophysical
stability, and no relationship between biophysical growth rates and
the level of unemployment.4.5. Limitations
Perhaps the most important limitation of this analysis relates to
the concept of indicators themselves. Indicators are only partial
reﬂections of reality, based on uncertain and imperfect models.
They are not the “real system”, and this must be kept in mind when
interpreting the results of any indictor analysis, including this one.
That said, we need indicators to summarise and condense the
enormous complexity of the real world into a manageable amount
of information (Meadows, 1998).
Some of the results of the analysis, such as the ﬁnding that the
US is a biophysically stable economy, and the UK is a partially
degrowing one, may come as a bit of a surprise. These ﬁndings
might make some members of the steady-state and degrowth
communities questionwhether the indicators that were chosen are
appropriate. One of the difﬁculties with trying to measure how
close countries are to a steady-state economy is that not all of the
data needed are currently available. A consumption-based
approach should ideally be used to measure ﬂows (O'Neill, 2015),
and yet the approach taken here, which aims to minimise uncer-
tainty and maximise country coverage, only partially accounts for
consumption. The ecological footprint and energy use indicators
measure apparent consumption, but the material use and CO2
emissions indicators are territorial measures. The incorporation of
new consumption-based indicators such as the “material footprint”
(see Wiedmann et al., 2015) could cast some countries in a very
different light.
Similarly, the analysis also neglects global power relations and
path dependency. It says nothing about how some countries have
managed to stabilise resource use. Is it through strong environ-
mental policy, lower rates of GDP growth, or offshoring environ-
mental impacts to other countries? This question should be
investigated in future analyses, particularly as consumption-based
indicators become more available.
The indicator chosen to measure biophysical scale (i.e. the ratio
of per capita ecological footprint to a fair earthshare) also repre-
sents a compromise. The footprint was chosen because it relates
national resource use to a clear sustainability threshold, and such a
threshold is needed in order to identify whether the sustainable
scale criterion associatedwith a steady-state economy is beingmet.
However, as an aggregated indicator of resource use, the footprint
provides no information on when speciﬁc ecological limits related
to key ecosystem services might be reached (Wiedmann and
Barrett, 2010). Future research should aim to develop new mea-
sures of sustainable scale based on indicators such as HANPP, water
use, CO2 emissions, and other planetary boundaries (e.g. Steffen
et al., 2015).
As new data become available, it will be possible to update the
accounts and see whether countries such as the US and UK
perform as well when more comprehensive resource use in-
dicators are applied. The results presented in this article are a “ﬁrst
pass”dan attempt to survey a large number of countries to see
which ones might be closest to a steady-state economy. Armed
with the results from this study, however, it becomes possible to
identify individual countries for further analysis using more
comprehensive indicators.
5. Conclusion
This study aimed to answer two questions: (i) How close are
modern-day national economies to a steady-state economy? (ii)
Are countries that are closer to a steady-state economy better or
worse places to live than those that are further away?
These questions were investigated using a collection of 16 in-
dicators applied to 181 countries over a 10-year period. The results
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economies, although there are around twenty countries that
achieve relatively stable stocks and ﬂows over the analysis period.
There is only one country in the world (Japan) that achieves
relative stability in all seven of the biophysical indicators, while
ﬁve countries (Denmark, France, Poland, Romania, and the US)
achieve stability in six out of the seven. There are no countries in
the world that achieve a true steady-state economy (i.e. stable
stocks and ﬂows at a level of resource use that is environmentally
sustainable). However, a small number of countries come rela-
tively close, including Colombia, Cuba, Kyrgyzstan, Romania, and
South Africa.
Countries with stable stocks and ﬂows tend to be better places
to live than countries with either growing or degrowing stocks
and ﬂows. Biophysically stable economies are more democratic
and more equal, and their citizens are happier and healthier than
those in growing or degrowing economies. This is encouraging
news for achieving a steady-state economy. However, social per-
formance is also higher in countries with greater per capita
resource use, and a high level of social performance is in general
only attained at a level of resource use that is too high to be
environmentally sustainable (as measured by the ecological foot-
print at least).
Indicators such as the ecological footprint suggest that resource
use in wealthy nations must be reduced if these nations are to
achieve a steady-state economy. However, the fact that social per-
formance is in general lower in countries where biophysical scale is
smaller presents a challenge to the degrowth agenda. If all seven
billion people on Earth are to lead a good life within ecological
limits, then we need to become much more efﬁcient at translating
resource use into human well-being.
This article challenges the idea, going back at least as far as
Adam Smith, that growth is synonymous with positive social
outcomes. The ﬁnding that biophysical stability and high social
performance are compatible increases the viability of the steady-
state alternative. The article does not show, however, that a high
level of social performance can be achieved at an environmentally
sustainable level of resource use. Further research is needed to
understand the relationship between resource use and human
well-being, and the extent to which this relationship is mediated
by different policies, aspirations, and institutions. Such research is
important because degrowth is not about scaling back resource
use within the current economic regime. It is about creating a
new economic model with different structures and objectives,
where very different understandings of “the good life” could
emerge.
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